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"Any Other Law-Enforcement Officer":
Federal Tort Claims Act § 2680(c)
INTRODUCTION

In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")'
to function as a waiver of sovereign immunity by the federal government.2 Incorporated into the statute itself are several exceptions to the
waiver of sovereign immunity? Under one such exception, the United

States asserts its right of sovereign immunity in the case of "[a]ny claim
arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs
duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of
customs or excise or any other law-enforcement officer." 4 The § 2680(c)

exception has become a subject of controversy among the circuit courts
of appeals due to a recent opinion by the Sixth Circuit, which set itself
in opposition to all the other circuits.5

The controversy concerns the proper interpretation and application of
the words "other law-enforcement officer."6 Does the term apply to all

law-enforcement officers acting within their official capacity, or does it
apply only to those law-enforcement officers, of whatever variety, who
are carrying out activities that are similar in nature to activities routinely
performed by tax officials or customs officials? The Sixth Circuit has
chosen the latter narrow approach,' while other circuits that have ruled

on the issue have chosen the former broad interpretation.'
1

The main body of the FTCA is located at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), (c) (1988).

2 Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 851-52 (1984).

Id. at 852 ("The Act's broad waiver of sovereign immunity is, however, subject
to 13 enumerated exceptions." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)-(f), (h)-(n))).
4 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) (1988).
Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 1994).
6 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
7 KuInsky, 33 F.3d at 597; see also Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777
F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1985) (Oakes, J., concurring); infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text; A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv. Dep't, 593 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (Tang, J., concurring); infira notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Halverson v. United States, 972 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1297 (1993); Cheney v. United States, 972 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1992)
(per curiam); Schlaebitz v. United States Dep'tof Justice, 924 F.2d 193 (lth Cir. 1991);
Ysasi v. Rivkind, 856 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned
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Part I of this Note discusses the historical background of this
controversy.9 Part II analyzes in chronological order federal court rulings

concerning the exception."

Part III examines in detail Kurinsky v.

United States, the Sixth Circuit case that created the circuit split.1 Part
IV analyzes the arguments advanced by the Sixth Circuit in Kurinsky and
explains why the Sixth Circuit's reasoning is unsound. 2 Finally, the
Note concludes that the proper interpretation of § 2680(c) is as a broad
exception which applies to 13
all law-enforcement officers, regardless of the

capacity in which they act.

I.

BACKGROUND

The principle of sovereign immunity comes from the English
common law. 4 Under English law, "the king could do no wrong."'" In
American jurisprudence, that concept translates into immunity for the
federal government unless it expressly grants permission for a lawsuit to

be brought against it. 6 Until Congress enacted the FrCA in 1946, it
granted such permission in the form of private bills.' These bills
provided individualized permission to sue the United States in the Court
of Claims. But the wheels of justice in these cases turned quite slowly,

Beef, Weighing Approximately 154,121 Pounds, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 825 (1984); United States v.
Lockheed L-188 Aircra% 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979).
9See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 25-140 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
n See infra notes 158-74 and accompanying text.

13See infra p. 731.
14See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal

Government, 9 LAW & CONEmp. PROBS. 311, 311 (1942) (discussing the history of
congressional acts which have allowed citizens to sue the federal government in tort and
the current mechanisms available for such lawsuits).
" See Barry R. Goldman, Note, Can the King Do No Wrong? A New Look at the
Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 26 GA. L. REV. 837,
837 & n.l (1992) (charting the development of the discretionary function exception and
analyzing the possible effect recent cases may have on the exception) (citing
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)); see also Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting) ("Surely a statute so long debated [the
Federal Tort Claims Act] was meant to embrace more than traffic accidents. If not, the
ancient and discredited doctrine that 'the king can do no wrong' has not been uprooted
...
."a
16Holtzoff, supra note 14, at 311; see also Goldman, supra note 15, at 837-38.
17Holtzoff, supra note 14, at 311; see also Goldman. supra note 15, at 837-38.
n Holtzoff, supra note 14, at 312-13.
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and by World War II, the burden on Congress in dealing with these
individual cases had become unbearable.'9
In response to this great burden, Congress enacted the FTCA. The
FTCA grants a broad waiver of sovereign immunity yet also codifies a

number of exceptions by enumerating the situations in which the federal
government will retain the protection of the common law doctrine.'
Section 2680(c) is one of these exceptions.
The first controversy regarding § 2680(c) was whether the exception

was applicable to damage resulting from not only the fact of detention
itself (such as lost rental on detained goods), but also the government's
negligence in regard to those detained goods (such as when goods are
damaged while in government custody). Controversy existed as to
whether both damage caused by negligence and injury caused by
detention itself should be covered. The Supreme Court resolved this issue
in Kosak v. United States by applying sovereign immunity to both

situations 2
Once this issue was resolved, the controversy regarding the exception's application to law-enforcement officers other than tax or customs
officials still remained. No logical foundation, other than the language of
the exception itself, supports the premise that the § 2680(c) exception

should apply to one group of law-enforcement officials but not to others.
In fact, the federal courts that have dealt with this issue have never
'9See Walter P. Armstrong & Howard Coclrill, The Federal Tort Claims Bill, 9
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 327, 327 & n.3 (1942) (providing an overview of the proposed
Federal Tort Claims Bill, the effects it would have if enacted, and the necessity for its
passage); see also Goldman, supra note 15, at 838.
"' Goldman, supra note 15, at 838-39.
465 U.S. 848, 854 (1984). Kosak involved detention of a serviceman's art
collection by customs officials upon his return to the United States from duty in Guam.
Id. at 849. These government actors were obviously customs officials acting in a customs
capacity. The issue in the case was whether the waiver of immunity applied to damages
due to negligence as well as to losses incident to the fact of detention. Id. at 851-52.
Resolving a split among the circuits, the Supreme Court held that the exception to waiver
of sovereign immunity applied across the board, whether the injury was the result of
negligence or the result of the fact of detention itself. Id. at 854; see also United States
v. $149,345 U.S. Currency, 747 F.2d 1278, 1283 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The counterclaim also
falls outside the Federal Tort Claims Act because the alleged injury arises from the
detention of the money itself... -).In a footnote, the Court addressed for the first time
the applicability of the exception to other law-enforcement officers. Kosak, 465 U.S. at
852 n.6. Due to the inadequacy of the facts of the case for decision on that issue, the
Court expressly declined to discuss it further. The facts were inadequate in that the
officials involved were customs officers, a category mentioned specifically in the
§ 2680(c) exception. Id.
LAW
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advanced any policy justification for such a distinction.? The courts
have focused their discussion solely on statutory construction.
While correct, the majority view concerning the application of
§ 2680(c) - that sovereign immunity covers the detention of goods by all
law-enforcement officers - represents a historical judicial bias in favor of
sovereign immunity.' The Sixth Circuit's minority approach set forth in
Kurinsky, on the other hand, may be motivated by modem judicial
activism. The Sixth Circuit, believing that the Kosak Court focused on the
detention-versus-damage issue and thus sidestepped the issue of how
broadly § 2680(c) should be read may be attempting to limit that
holding's application. However, Kurinsky is wrongly decided and should
be reversed by the Supreme Court.
II.

FEDERAL COURT TREATMENT

The first case to deal with the breadth of § 2680(c) arose in 1952,
just four years after passage of the FTCA? Chambers v. United States
involved a seizure by the Alcohol Tax Unit of the Treasury Department
The plaintiff alleged that Treasury agents wrongfully seized
several cases of liquor that belonged to her under a search warrant that
had been issued against her husband. She filed suit against the government under the FTCA, alleging a loss of $1194.95.2
The Kansas District Court held that the loss fell within the § 2680(c)
exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. In so holding, the court
stated: "Assuming for present purposes, although not deciding, that the

' See, e.g., Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 1994); Halverson v.

United States, 972 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1297 (1993);
Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985); A-Mark, Inc.
v. United States Secret Serv. Dep't, 593 F.2d 849, 850 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (rang,
J., concurring).
2' See, e.g., Halverson, 972 F.2d at 656; Cheney v. United States, 972 F.2d 247 (8th
Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Schlaebitz v. United States Dep't of Justice, 924 F.2d 193 (1lth
Cir. 1991); Ysasi v. Rivkind, 856 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1988); United States v. 2,116
Boxes of Boned Beef, Weighing Approximately 154,121 Pounds, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United States, 469 U.S. 825 (1984);
United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircrai% 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979).
2 Kurinsky, 33 F.3d at 596 ([T]he Supreme Court has refused to determine whether
§ 2680(c) applies where the officers who detained the property were not customs or tax
officials and were not acting in a customs or tax capacity." (citing Kosakl 465 U.S. at 852
n.6)).
'5 Chambers v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 601 (D. Kan. 1952).
26 Id. at 602.
27 Id.
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alleged acts were non-discretionary, still plaintiff cannot recover. Her
claim arises out of 'the detention of... goods or merchandise by...
' The ellipses,
law-enforcement officer' and hence is within § 2680(c)."28
part of the text of the opinion, indicate the disjointed construction that the
court gave the statute. It appears that the court did not consider the phrase
"any other law-enforcement officer" to be related in any way to the
words "tax" and "customs," which the court omitted from the quotation.' Consequently, the court had no trouble applying the exception."
Four years later, the Maryland District Court confronted the issue of
the breadth of the exception's application in Jones v. FBI.31 In a colorful
pro se complaint the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that FBI agents illegally
took his family's property with the "intent to convert said property to
their own use."' The court interpreted this "point" along with two
others as follows:
Points One, Five and Seven allege the taking by special agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and others and the conversion "to their
own use" of property of plaintiff and his family. If plaintiff intends to
charge a detention of the property by the agents in the exercise of their
duties, the claims are excepted from the provisions of the Tort Claims
Act by sec. 2680(c).33
As the above excerpt indicates, the court found no requirement that the
FBI agents' duties entail anything in the nature of tax or customs
activities in order for a claim to fall within the § 2680(c) exception. The
court merely required that, for the exception to apply, the property be
detained by the agents in execution of their normal duties.'

u Id. at 602-03.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).
'0 See Chambers, 107 F. Supp. at 602-03.
3, 139 F. Supp. 38 (D. Md. 1956).

Id. at 40. Plaintiff contended.
Special Agents of the F.B.I., along with two other unidentified men and Mr.
Chew, Mgr. of Motel "66", did, then and there, illegally, feloniously and
without legal process, steal, rob and carry away more than 40 pieces of
property, belonging to Plaintiff and his family, with intent to convert said
property to their own use.
32

Id.
31Id. at

42.
' Id. Interestingly, the opinion also made no mention of the items allegedly taken.
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In the following year, 1957, the Seventh Circuit lent its support to the
majority approach in United States v. 1500 Cases, More or Less. 5 This
case in admiralty concerned the seizure of cans of tomato paste from
railroad cars by agents of the FDA.' Lengthy litigation ensued over
whether the tomato paste was adulterated. 7 Reversing in part in the first
of two appellate court decisions, the circuit court found that only some
of the paste was adulterated. Meanwhile, the cans of paste were stored in
Crooks Terminal Warehouse in Chicago.' The United States paid the
charges for the storage during the time of detention but refused to pay
certain pre-seizure charges demanded by the claimant. The circuit court
explained how the charges were incurred:
The pre-seizure charges arose from unloading the railroad cars and
moving the cartons of tomato paste to a place of storage in the terminal
warehouse. This was done on orders of the Campbell Soup Company
to whom the shipments had been directed, and who had refused to
accept delivery after learning the Food and Drug Administration desired
to obtain samples for laboratory analysis. 9
Using a "but for" analysis, the district court found that the FDA had
ordered the cans held at the warehouse by recommending them for
detention. But for that embargo of the goods, the charges would not have
been incurred. Thus, the district court required the FDA to pay those preseizure storage costs.4"
Basing its decision on 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), the Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court's award of damages in the second appellate
decision.41 The FDA agents were acting in neither a customs nor a tax
capacity. They could only have been included in the § 2680(c) exception

See generally id.
" 249 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1957). This case is one of several forfeiture cases in which
the government brought suit against contraband itself or against instrumentalities of illegal
activity, rather than against the owners of the contraband or instrunmentalities.
'6Id. at 383.
37 Id. Adulteration refers to the mixing of genuine products with those of inferior
quality, thus making them "impure and unfit for consumption. Such is prohibited and
regulated by federal and state statutes and agencies." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 51 (6th
ed. 1990).
"' 1500 Cases, 249 F.2d at 383.
39 Id.

4 Id.
41

Id. at 384.
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to the waiver of sovereign immunity as law-enforcement officers
generally, as they were merely enforcing the provisions of the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.42
The first Sixth Circuit case on this issue came in 1962 with Van
Buskirk v. United States.43 FBI agents arrested Van Buskirk for "a
scheme to defraud."' At the time of his arrest, the agents seized
"$6,999.63, six pieces of luggage, a diamond ring and a watch"45 and
turned those items over to a United States Deputy Marshal in Arkansas,
where the arrest occurred.'
The Department of Justice refused the request to release the property
made by Van Buskirk's lawyer, who had been assigned the property after
detention. The Department, replying by letter, indicated that the ownership of the property was in question and "that the property may already
have been assigned to an attorney in Little Rock."'47 The letter contained
no indication that the United States made any claim to the property
seized.48 The court held not only that the § 2680(c) exception would bar
the claim, but also that the FTCA did not even apply[W]e must conclude that the effect of Section 2680 is to withdraw the
consent of the United Staes [sic] to be sued where the claim is based
upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government exercising
due care in the execution of a statute or regulation, or upon the
detention of goods by a law-enforcement officer. Although plaintiffs
argue with some plausibility to the contrary, we are of the opinion that
subsection (c) is not confined to activities of Government officers in
connection with taxes and customs duties. In any event, on the facts
alleged, we do not believe that a case is made out under either section,
since the property hasn't been injured or lost in the one case, and since
there has been no conversion or basis for a tort action against the
United States in the other.4 9
21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
4 206 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
"Id. at 554. The FBI contended that Van Buskirk had violated a federal statute
relating to stolen property. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1988 & Supp. 1990) (providing the
current version of the related statute).
41 Van Buskirk, 206 F. Supp. at 554.
4Id.
47Id.
48 Id. at 554-55.
49 Id. at 556 (citations omitted). Although the court held that neither § 1346(b),
which relates to money damages, nor § 2674, which also relates to tort claims, applied
here, the court noted that the plaintiffs' argument had some "plausibility" to it. Van
4'
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While the discussion of § 2680(c) could rightly be characterized as dicta
since the court held that the FTCA itself did not apply," this case

marked the first basis for an argument against broad application of the
exception to all law-enforcement officers. According to the court, the
plaintiffs' position that the exception applies only to "activities of
Government officers in connection with taxes and custom duties" was

somewhat defensible.5 Appropriately, this idea of limiting the application of the § 2680(c) exception came from the Sixth Circuit, which thirty

years later would revisit the "plausibility" of such a position. 2
After Van Buskirk, the § 2680(c) issue went into dormancy as a
settled issue of law. Consequently, thirteen years later, when the Idaho
District Court was asked to apply the exception in United States v.
Articles of Food,53 that court followed the party line without much
-discussion. In Articles of Food, FDA agents seized several hundred cases
of Clover Club Golden Potato Chips due to allegedly false and misleading labeling. The United States filed a forfeiture proceeding against the
cases of potato chips, and Clover Club Food Company intervened,
claiming the cases.' Clover Club brought a counterclaim under the

Tucker Act55 and moved to amend the counterclaim to include an action

based on the FTCA.5 Clover Club argued that the § 2680(c) exception
to the waiver of sovereign immunity should not apply - not because the

FDA agents were not acting in a tax or customs capacity, but because the
damages sought were not due to the detention of the cases of potato
Buskirk, 206 F. Supp. at 556. The plaintiffs in this case were Van Buskirk, the individual
arrested by the FBI; William E. Badgett, the attorney who represented Van Buskirk in the
criminal proceedings; and Helen F. Hubert, an individual who acted as surety on Van
Buskirk's bond. Id. at 554.
" This case was decided before Kosak. The quotation in the text above drew a
distinction - between damage due to negligence and damage due to the fact of detention
- that is no longer relevant. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
" Van Buskirk, 206 F. Supp. at 556.
'2 See Kurinsky v. United States, 33 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 1994).
67 F.R.D. 419 (D. Idaho 1975).
'4Id. at 421.
ss28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (providing the current version of the
related statute). The Tucker Act provides for actions against the United States "not
exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort... :'Id.Thus, the main body of the Tucker Act is codified in the same
section as is the main portion of the FTCA, which is found at § 1346(b) and (c). See
supra note 1.
Articles of Food, 67 F.R.D. at 424.
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chips. Clover Club claimed that the damage was caused by the seizure of
the chips, not their detention, a distinction without a difference according
to the court. The parties and the court apparently assumed it was settled
that the exception applied to the FDA agents, even though they were not
acting in a tax or customs capacity.' The court ultimately ruled that
Clover Club's "counterclaim [was] barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)."'
Three years later the Ninth Circuit decided A-Mark, Inc. v. United
59 This case is important because
States Secret Service Department.
its
concurring opinion provides the first example of a judicial argument in
favor of a limited application of § 2680(c). 60 A-Mark involved the
seizure and detention of a rare silver dollar 6' by the United States
Treasury Department. The plaintiff had submitted the coin to the Treasury
Department for authentication.' Treasury experts found that it was
authentic except for a counterfeit mint mark.63 On this basis, the Secret
Service kept the coin "pending investigation."' When it was returned
to the plaintiff, the silver dollar was allegedly severely damaged, and this
damage provided the basis for the lawsuit.65
The majority opinion dismissed the claim based on a construction of
§ 2680(c) that allowed claims for damage which occurred as a result of
the detention itself but not for damage which resulted from negligence."
Since the damage resulted from negligence, the court found that the
§ 2680(c) exception did not apply and consequently remanded the case
for trial.'
Judge Tang, in a concurring opinion, reached the same result by
limiting the scope of the § 2680(c) exception to law-enforcement officials
acting in a tax or customs capacity."s According to Tang, the exception
" Id. The court never even considered whether a distinction exists between the
position of an FDA official and the position of a law-enforcement officer acting in a tax
or customs capacity as discussed in § 2680(c).
SBArticles of Food, 67 F.R.D. at 425.
5 593 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
Id. at 850 (Tang, J., concurring) (arguing that application of § 2680(c) should be

limited to law-enforcement officers acting in a tax or customs capacity).
"The silver dollar was valued by the plaintiff at $29,000. Id. at 849.
'Id.
6 Id. at 849-50.
"Id. at 850. The Secret Service detained the coin in order to determine if it had
been fraudulently altered, mutilated, or falsified "in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 311." Id.
6Id. at 849.
"Id. at 850. The Supreme Court later rejected this view in Kosak See supra note
21 and accompanying text.
67 A-Mark, 593 F.2d at 850.
mId. at 850-51 (Tang, J., concurring).
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should only apply when law-enforcement officers (regardless of variety)
are involved in activities that are similar in nature to those activities
traditionally carried out by tax or customs officials. In his view "a better
rationale is to read § 2680(c) as covering only those detentions which
occur within the context of customs and tax activities." Judge Tang
reached this conclusion by employing the following statutory construction:
[Section] 2680(c) contains parallel clauses which cover "the assessment
or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods
or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other lawenforcement officer." (emphasis added). The clauses both dwell
exclusively on customs and taxes, except for the final reference to other
law-enforcement officers. The "any other law-enforcement officer"
phrase should be viewed as Congress' recognition of the fact that federal
officers, other than customs and excise officers, sometimes become
involved in the activity of detaining goods for tax or customs purpos7
es. 0
In other words, Tang viewed the structure of the provision as evidence
that Congress meant to provide exceptions to the FTCA's general waiver
of sovereign immunity only for tax and customs activities, regardless
of the character of the government agency involved. 7' However, since
these Treasury officials were not engaged in tax or customs activities,
Tang agreed with the majority that the § 2680(c) exception did not
apply.7
Tang's concurrence in A-Mark, however, was not met with enthusiasm
in his own circuit or elsewhere. In fact, a year later, when the Ninth
Circuit ruled directly on the proper application of § 2680(c) in a case
involving agents of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), Tang's
contrary view was relegated to a footnote.73
Id.at 850-51 (Tang, J., concurring) (emphasis added) ("The governmental function
of assessing and collecting customs duties necessarily requires some period of detention
when the imported item is inspected for purposes of evaluation. A similar situation often
arises when property must be levied against for tax purposes. It follows that where the
ultimate act of assessing the tax or duty is rendered exempt, the incidental activity of
detention must also be protected.").
Id. at 851 (Tang, J., concurring).
71
Id. (Tang, J., concurring). Again, this instance is the first occasion the idea was
given any real respect, and it did not carry the day.
72Id. (Tang,
7

J., concurring).

United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft, 656 F.2d 390, 397 n.17 (9th Cir. 1979).
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The facts of United States v. Lockheed L-188 Aircraft were somewhat
complicated. International Air Leases, Inc. ("IAL") leased the aircraft
named in the lawsuit to a company called Air Houston Corporation. Air
Houston, in turn, subleased the aircraft to Air Flow with IAL's consent. ' The aircraft was seized once by agents of the FAA and again by
a United States Marshal, and it was released when IAL posted a $25,000
bond.75 IAL, as owner of the aircraft, was the only party to challenge
the seizure; it brought an action against the United States under the
Tucker Act.76 When that counterclaim was dismissed because the claim
constituted a tort action, which is not permitted under the Tucker Act,'
IAL sought to amend its complaint to include a cause of action under the
FTCA." The government, citing the immunity provided by § 2680(c),
argued against the motion.7" The circuit court found in favor of the
government and affirmed the denial of the plaintiff's motion for leave to
amend the complaint. The court explained:
IAL responds that this is not an action involving customs or taxes
and therefore the exception does not apply. Section 2680(c), however,
does not apply solely to loss from detention of goods by tax or customs
officers, but includes actions by "any other law enforcement officer."
The seizure of IAL's aircraft by FAA officials appears to fall within
the exception!0
...

Again, the court dismissed Judge Tang's construction of §2 2860(c) as
presented in A-Mark, 1 relegating his opinion to a footnote.
Five years later, Tang's view fared even worse, as it elicited no
mention at alL Instead, the Tenth Circuit in United States v. 2,116 Boxes
74Id. at 392.
7S

Id. at 393. The bond "replaced the aircraft as the res of the in rem action." Id.
see supra note 55 and accompanying text.

76Id.;
'7

Lockheed, 656 F.2d at 394.

In the Tucker Act, the government consented to be sued in district court in
civil actions or claims against the United States:
not exceeding $10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or
any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for

liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sound'ng in tort.
Id. at 393-94 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1976) (emphasis added)).
, Id. at 397.
'Id.

90Id.

,See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text.
'Lockheed, 656 F.2d at 397 n.17.
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of Boned Beef, Weighing Approximately 154,121 Pounds3 lent its
support to what had become the standard interpretation of § 2680(c). In
that case, the USDA, after observing evidence of the use of diethylstilbestrol' in the animals, seized 273 beef carcasses owned by a company
called Jarboe-Lackey. This practice, according to the USDA, constituted
adulteration under the Federal Meat Inspection Act.' When the district
court ruled against the USDA, Jarboe-Lackey filed a counterclaim for
damages under the FTCA.86 Citing United States v. Lockheed L-1881 7
and United States v. 1500 Cases, More or Less,' the Tenth Circuit
rejected Jarboe-Lackey's claim:
The United States... has not waived its immunity to liability with
respect to claims arising from the "detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement
officer." This express reservation of sovereign immunity requires
dismissal of appellant's first count.8 9
Although the case involved neither tax nor customs officials or activities,
the court used what had become conventional statutory interpretation and
applied the exception of § 2680(c) to USDA inspectors carrying out their
normal duties.
In 1984, the Ninth Circuit decided United States v. $149,345 U.S.
Currency, a case involving seizure of drug money.9 The owners of the
money were lawyers and claimed that the money was not for drugs but
was a retainer from an unnamed client.9' In a prior civil case against the
government for the return of the funds, one attorney, asserting attorneyclient privilege, had refused to release the name of the client to the
court.' The judge, finding that the identity of the client was not
privileged, had then dismissed the civil lawsuit as a sanction.93
726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir.), cer. denied, Jarboe-Lackey Feedlots, Inc. v. United
States, 469 U.S. 825 (1984).
" Diethylstilbestrol is a "growth promotant in animals [which] leaves potentially
carcinogenic residues in edible portions of meat." Id. at 1484.
8' Id. The current version of the Federal Meat Inspection Act is codified at21 U.S.C.
§ 601(m) (1988 & Supp. 1992).
6Boned Beef, 726 F.2d at 1484.
87 656 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
88 249 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1957); see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
89 Boned

Beef, 726 F.2d at 1491 (citations omitted).

747 F.2d 1278, 1279 (9th Cir. 1984).
9' Id. at 1278.
02Id. at 1279.
93Id.
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In this forfeiture action by the government, the attorneys asserted an
interest in the funds, and one counterclaimed for $5000. The Ninth
Circuit dismissed their claims, ruling that the issue of ownership was
barred by res judicata by virtue of the prior civil law suit.' The court
nevertheless expounded that the counterclaim would be barred anyway by
the § 2680(c) exception."
Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States96 is not directly on point,
but it is one of the most important cases in this line because of the logical
acrobatics the Second Circuit had to go through to decide the issue on the
basis of the § 2680(c) exception. Judge Tang's concurrence in A-Mark'
had begun to generate debate at last.
The case involved a 1971 Mercedes Benz convertible that Formula
One had imported from Italy." Upon the automobile's arrival, DEA
agents seized it in order to conduct a thorough search for narcotics.'
Formula One alleged that the extensive search completely destroyed the
car and brought a lawsuit against the government under the FTCA.'"
The government countered with the § 2680(c) exception: "In the
Government's view, section 2680(c) applies to damages incurred in the
course of any search and seizure undertaken by any law enforcement
officer.''. The court, not persuaded that § 2680(c) should be read so
broadly, stated:
The terms of the statute, construed in light of the doctrine of ejusdem
generis,'02 might suggest a more narrow reading. First it can be
argued that the "detention!' to which section 2680(c) applies is not every
physical seizure preliminary to a search but only a possession effected

Id. at 1283.
Id. The court articulated the intent of the exception: "to limit governmental liability
for improper seizures and to restrict claimants to the statutory procedures of the forfeiture

laws" Id. (citing A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv. Dep't, 593 F.2d 849, 850 (9th

Cir. 1978) (per curiam)).

9777 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that the detention of an automobile by DEA
agents falls within the § 2680(c) exception).

" A-Mark, 593 F.2d at 850-51 (Tang, J., concurring) (stating that § 2680(c) should
be limited to detention by law-enforcement officials acting in a tax or customs capacity);
see supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.

" Formula One, 777 F.2d at 822-23.
9 Id. at 823.
100
Id.
101
Id. (emphasis added).
'a'The doctrine of ejusdem generis is discussed infra notes 145-47 and accompanying
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in the course of assessing or collecting any tax or customs duty.
Second, it might also be thought that the specification of "any officer
of customs or excise" followed by "any other law-enforcement officer"
implies that other law enforcement officers are covered only when their
actions are in aid of customs or excise functions of the Govern03
ment.
The above language, however, was dicta; the court, following prior circuit
court rulings, went on to find that the actions of the DEA agents were
sufficiently similar to the functions normally carried out by customs
agents to warrant application of the immunity allowed by § 2680(c).'1 '
In a concurring opinion, Judge Oakes expressed his unequivocal
position that the § 2680(c) exception applies to law-enforcement officers
acting only in a tax or customs capacity. He nevertheless agreed with the
majority's holding, since he was of the opinion that DEA agents "acting
in a border or customs search seeking to uncover contraband are the
05
'other'law enforcement officers Congress envisaged.'
A federal district court in Florida decided Milburn v. United States
in 1986. l"' In a cloak-and-dagger episode, several individuals arranged
to have a Piper Aztec aircraft commandeered from the possession of
authorities in the Turks and Caicos Islands, who had seized it as forfeited
because of its alleged involvement in drug activity. 7 Shortly after the
individuals returned with the aircraft to Fort Lauderdale, the local police
seized it as stolen property and notified the FBI."' The U.S. Marshal
Service impounded the plane and later returned it to authorities of the
Turks and Caicos Islands.9 Considering the "plain language of the
statute," the court held that the § 2680(c) exception barred the plaintiffs'
claim against the United States for damages caused by the detention of
the aircraft." 0
Formula One, 777 F.2d at 823 (footnote added).
Id. at 823-24 (adopting the approach taken by the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits "that section 2680(c) applies to detentions beyond the context of customs duties
and taxes").
10-Id. at 825 (Oakes, J., concurring).
106647 F. Supp. 1521 (S.D. Fla. 1986).
oId. at 1523.
'0

104

1& Id.

"9Id. at 1523-24.
"0 Id. at 1524-25. The court noted: "When the-F.B.I. and the Marshal Service found
and seized the stolen plane, they were involved in precisely the type of activity that is
exempted from liability by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)." Id. at 1525. The court also cited United
States v. $149,345 U.S. Currency, 747 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1984), as support for finding
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Although the Federal Circuit in Ysasi v. Rivkind"' had a similar
opportunity to dodge the issue of the potential applicability of § 2680(c)
to law-enforcement officials acting outside of tax or customs functions as
the Second Circuit had in Formula One," the court ruled in favor of

a broad interpretation. In that case, Lauro T. Ysasi had used his truck to
transport his brother, an illegal alien, from Texas to Florida in violation

of immigration laws.'

Border patrol agents seized his truck pursuant

to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)."14 When the INS remitted the truck to GMAC,
the primary lien holder on the vehicle, Ysasi sued the INS for damages
under the FTCA" ' The INS, predictably, argued in favor of application
of the § 2680(c) exception to the general waiver of sovereign immunity
under the FTCA." The appellate court upheld the district court's
interpretation of § 2680(c), which favored a broad reading of the
statute."1 7 Consequently, the court found that "Ysasi's FTCA claim was
barred by section 2680(c) ... .""' The court did buttress its holding,
however, with a comparison of INS and customs functions:
Furthermore, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b)(3) directs that all provisions of law
relating to seizures for violation of the customs laws shall apply to

"that actions of law-enforcement agents other than customs officials are exempt from
liability under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)." Id. at 1524-25.
.11
856 F.2d 1520, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (basing the decision on Eleventh Circuit law
and holding that seizures for customs violations fall within the § 2680(c) exception).
"1See supra note 104 and accompanying text. The Federal Circuit in Ysasi could
have ruled that the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") was acting in a
customs capacity and thus avoided the issue as to whether § 2680(c) is applicable to all
law-enforcement officers. Instead, the court first ruled on the applicability of § 2680(c)
and then compared INS operations with customs activities.
113 Ysasi, 856 F.2d at 1522; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2) (1982) ("Any person ... who
...transports or moves ...within the United States by means of transportation or
otherwise, in furtherance of such violation of law ...any alien.. shall be guilty of a
felony ....).
114 Ysasi, 856 F.2d at 1522; see 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) (1982) (allowing the government
to seize vehicles used in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)).
...
Ysasi, 856 F.2d at 1522-23.
" Id. at 1523.

Id. at 1525.
..Id. The court stated:
We agree with the district court that the clear weight of authority favors the
government's position. ... Certainly the government's broad reading of the
section comports with the report, the Kosak opinion and the plain language of
the statute, whereas Ysasi's interpretation would render the phrase "or any other
law enforcement officer" surplusage.
Id. at 1524. For the report mentioned in the above quotation, see Alexander Holtzoff,
Report on Proposed Federal Tort Claims Bill 16 (1931).
117
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seizures under section 1324(b)(1), indicating the similarity of the
violations of law here to violations of customs laws. We, therefore,
agree with the district court that seizures pursuant to section 1324(b)(1)
are "sufficiently akin to the functions carried out by Customs officials
to place the agents' conduct within the scope of section 2680(c).".. 9
Regardless of the additional support provided by the similarity of
functions involved, which may not appear in other cases involving the
§ 2680(c) issue, this opinion represents a positive ruling in favor of broad
application of the § 2680(c) exception to all law-enforcement officers
acting in any official capacity.
Ysasi was decided by the Federal Circuit on the basis of Eleventh
Circuit law.'2' Three years later, the Eleventh Circuit itself ruled on the
issue in Schlaebitz v. United States Department of Justice.21 In
Schlaebitz, U.S. Marshals arrested the plaintiff upon his arrival in the
United States after deportation from Grand Cayman Island. The Marshals
proceeded to confiscate eleven pieces of luggage that the plaintiff valued
at $11,000." According to the Justice Department, the luggage was
later turned over to a third party;, Schlaebitz disputed this contention.'
He brought a lawsuit, proceeding pro se, for $11,000 in damages under
the FTCA. 24 Citing previous cases addressing this issue," the court
followed their approach. The Schlaebitz court acknowledged: "The
circuits that have addressed the issue ... all agree that 'other lawenforcement officer' may include officers in other agencies performing
their proper duties .... As the Ysasi court stated, this interpretation
comports well with both the Kosak opinion and the purpose of the

"9

Ysasi, 856 F.2d at 1525.

Id. at 1524. The jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit is determined by subject matter.
It hears appeals originating in any district court concerning patent, copyright, and
trademark law. It also hears appeals from the United States Claims Court and the United
120

States Court of International Trade. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN

Er. AL,

THE PROCESS

OF LEGAL

140 (3d ed. 1992). The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction over Tucker Act
claims. See United States v. Hohri, 482 U.S. 64, 75-76 (1987).
"z' 924 F.2d 193 (llth Cir. 1991) (holding that the detention of goods by U.S.
Marshals acting within their legal authority falls under the § 2680(c) exception).
'22 Id. at 193-94.
RESEARCH

123 Id.

at 194.

Id.
"' Id. The Court cited Ysasi, see supra notes 111-20 and accompanying text,
Formula One, see supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text, Boned Beef, see supra
notes 83-89 and accompanying text, and Milburn, see supra notes 106-10 and accompany124

ing text.

1994-95]

SECTION

2680(c)

EXCEPTION

statute."'' 6 Thus, the court dismissed Schlaebitz's claim as it found that
§ 2680(c) exempts the government from liability in such cases. 7
The influence of Judge Tang's concurrence in A-Mark' cannot be
emphasized too strongly. Once that view was treated with respect in
Formula One," it gave plaintiffs ammunition to challenge the
§ 2680(c) exception in Ysasi and Schlaebitz, and it forced the judges in
those cases to reopen for debate a heretofore seemingly settled rule of
law.
Cheney v. United States, 3' on the other hand, is an interesting case,
if only for the plaintiff's artful argument against the application of the
§ 2680(c) exception and an enigmatic two-sentence dissent. In Cheney,
federal drug task force agents seized the contents of a safe-deposit box
owned jointly by Thomas Cheney and Stephanie Oberbroeckling. The box
contained a car title certificate that Cheney claimed to own. Cheney had
left the vehicle to which the certificate applied at a storage facility and
had told the storage facility to release the car to anyone holding the title
certificate. The agents delivered the title to Oberbroeckling and informed
her of the agreement. Oberbroeckling retrieved the car, and it was
destroyed while in her possession. Cheney brought an action under the
FTCA, alleging that the United States was liable for the loss of the car
because the agents released the title certificate to Oberbroeckling.''
The district court applied the § 2680(c) exception based on the
detention of the certificate. Cheney argued that since the car itself was
never detained by the government, the exception did not apply."
Perhaps this argument is the one to which Judge Gibson referred in his
dissent: "I am not convinced that the 1976 Datsun 280Z is 'goods or
merchandise' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c)."'3 However,

Schlaebitz, 924 F.2d at 194-95 (citations omitted).
Id. at 195 ("Here there is no contention that the Marshalls [sic] were not acting
within their lawful authority. The Tort Claims Act specifically exempts any claim based
on the detention of goods by law enforcement officers in the performance of their lawful
'
'

duties.").
'' A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv. Dep't, 593 F.2d 849, 850-51 (9th Cir.
1978) (per curiam) (Tang, J., concurring); see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
" Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822, 823 (2d Cir. 1985); see
supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
' 972 F.2d 247-48 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (holding that the detention of a car
title certificate falls within the § 2680(c) exception when the car is later damaged as a

result of releasing the car title certificate to a third party).
U3 Id. at 248.
13 Id.
3 Id. at 249 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
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the court held that the damage arose "in respect of"'" the detention of

the certificate of title and therefore fell within the limits of the exception.13 The court did not debate the scope of the exception but rather
assumed that § 2680(c) is a "broad exception to the FTCA's general
waiver of sovereign immunity in cases arising out of the detention of

property by law enforcement officers."'"
The Fifth Circuit's first ruling on the issue, Halverson v. United

States,' 37 is also the latest to find in favor of a broad application of the
§ 2680(c) exception, but the court's analysis adds nothing to the debate.
Halverson involved detention of personal property by agents of the INS.

Pursuant to an arrest for possession of cocaine, the plaintiff was stopped
at an immigration checkpoint in Texas."3 Ronald Halverson, a passenger in the car, claimed that his property was lost due to improper
inventory procedures implemented by the INS agents.'39 In knee-jerk
fashion, the Fifth Circuit, apparently afraid to break ranks with its sister
circuits, applied the § 2680(c) exception to the case and upheld the
district court's dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdic-

tion. 40 And with that ruling, the stage was set for the renegade circuit.

II. THE CoNmR.ovEasy
Enter the Sixth Circuit and Kurinsky v. United States. 4' Kurinsky
involved an FBI seizure of equipment used in the violation of cable
television and wire fraud laws." Andrew Kurinsky alleged that some

equipment was lost, some was damaged, and some items not unique to
the cable industry were seized. For these reasons, Kurinsky brought three

'34

28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).

'3' Cheney, 972 F.2d at 248-49.
136Id.

at 248.

- 972 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding that "§ 2680(c) exempts from the
FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity any claim based on the detention of goods by any
federal law enforcement officers in the performance of their lawful duties"), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1297 (1993).
Id. at 655.
139Id.

SId. at 656 ("We find persuasive the reasoning of the other circuits, not to mention
the plain language of § 2680(c) . . ").
14, 33 F.3d 594, 598 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that § 2680(c)
applies only to the
detention of goods by an official acting in a "tax or customs capacity').
42
' Id. at 595. The property was seized pursuant to statutes prohibiting the unauthorized reception of cable services and relating to wire fraud. See 47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)
(1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp. 1990) respectively, for the current versions of the
relevant statutes discussed.
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counts pursuant to the FTCA.14 3 The government invoked the § 2680(c)

exception as a bar to liability."
The court took issue with the government's reading of the statute for

several different reasons. First, the doctrine of ejusdem generis was
14
referenced in conjunction with the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. 1
Ejusdem generis is a rule of statutory construction whereby a general

term is interpreted as limited by the specific terms listed with it." This
simplistic explanation could be the reason for the holding.'47

Noscitur a sociis was described by the court as a construction
whereby "a general term is interpreted within the context of the accompa-

nying words 'to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of
Congress.""" This definition seems to pose more questions than it
answers. 49 Basically, the court used these two tools of construction to
determine that the general phrase "any other law-enforcement officer" is
delimited by the specific terms "tax" and "customs" used in the same

provision."s
143 Kurinsky,

33 F.3d at 595.
at 595-96.
141Id. at 596-97.
144 Id.

' 2ANoRMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATuTES AND STATJTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 47.17 (5th ed. 1992). The Kurinsky court explained the concept in a footnote:
This term is defined in BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 464 (5th ed. 1979) as
follows: Of the same kind, class, or nature. In the construction of laws, wills,
and other instruments, the "ejusdem generis rule" is, that where general words
follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same
general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. The nile, however, does
not necessarily require that the general provision be limited in its scope to the
identical things specifically named. Nor does it apply when the context
manifests a contrary intention.
33 F.3d at 596 n.2.
47
Ejusdem generis is discussed in more detail infra notes 166-68 and accompanying
text.
1- Kurinsky, 33 F.3d at 597 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307
(1961)). The court again gave more detail in a footnote:
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY ...defines this term as follows: It is known from
its associates. The meaning of a word is or may be known from the accompanying words. Under the doctrine of "noscitur a sociis," the meaning of questionable words or phrases in a statute may he ascertained by reference to the
meaning of words or phrases associated with it
Id. at 597 n.3.
Noscitur a sociis is discussed in more detail infra note 162 and accompanying
text.
"o Kurinsky, 33 F.3d at 597 ("Here, the specific terms 'tax'and 'customs duty' indicate
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The court also noted a distinction between the words "seizure" and
"detention" used in § 2680(c).' Though lengthy, the court's interpretation is included in its entirety so that the illogical connection made by the
court between the definitions of the words and the interpretation of the
phrase "any other law-enforcement officer" can be demonstrated:
Significantly, Congress chose to use the word "detention" instead of the
word "seizure." A detention is generally associated with a period of
temporary custody or delay. It carries no connotation of permanent
custody, nor does it necessarily suggest an adversarial interest insofar
as ownership is concerned. It is a term often associated with an ongoing
investigation. A seizure, on the other hand, must be viewed as a term
of art in this context. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1219 (5th ed. 1979)
defines seizure as "[t]he act of taking possession of property, e.g., for
a violation of law or by virtue of an execution." In common with a
"detention," a "seizure" may be temporary and involve the goods of
another, however, a seizure has an "after-the-fact" quality not associated
with a detention. When goods are seized pursuant to a lawful search,
their relevance to a legal proceeding already has been predetermined.
Similarly, if goods are seized pursuant to an execution or forfeiture,
there is no intention to return. The seizure is adversarial to the
ownership interest of the person from whom the property is seized. Had
Congress intended to except from the reach of the FTCA damages
arising out of seizures, we believe it would have said so. Instead,
Congress elected to use the word detention, and to be consistent with
this language, § 2680(c) must be read as only applying to law enforcement officers engaged in activities with a nexus to the collection of
taxes or customs duties."
The court's leap between the final two sentences of the passage is
puzzling. How does the use of the word "detention' rather than "seizure"
have anything to do with how the phrase "any other law-enforcement
officer" is interpreted? Agents of the DEA can detain as well as seize
goods - so can FBI agents and tax and customs officials for that matter.
The distinction between "detentiorf' and "seizure," as used in the statute
and applied to the case, is actually a separate ground for deciding the
case. In other words, because the FBI agents seized the cable television
that Congress was concerned with those detentions, however they might arise, occurring
within the context of tax and customs activities.").
151Id.
13 Id.
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equipment rather than detaining it, the activity did not fall within the
exception for the "detention of
any goods or merchandise by... any
153
officer."
law-enforcement
other
The court next turned to a portion of the legislative history previously
trumpeted by both sides of the debate. The court quoted a Senate Report
to the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946"s and Alexander
Holtzoff, the individual credited with drafting the FTCA and who
appeared before a Senate subcommittee considering the FrCA 55 The
report "makes no mention whatsoever of an exemption for any and all
seizures by law-enforcement officers."'- In his remarks to the Senate
subcommittee, Holtzoff phrased his understanding of the thrust of the
exception: "[the § 2680(c) exception] relates to claims arising in respect
of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the
detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or
excise or any other law enforcement officer."'57 Holtzoff's phraseology,
then, seems to support limiting the scope of the exception, which is the
Sixth Circuit's position.
IV. WHo's RIGHT?
Has the Sixth Circuit made its case? It relied on three arguments in
support of its holding: the doctrines of ejusdem generis 58 and noscitur
a sociis,'59 a distinction between the terms "detention" and "seizure,2' 60 and the legislative history of the Act.'6 ' First, ejusdem generis is a specific form of the more general concept, noscitur a sociis.'x
Second, the argument as to the distinction between the terms "detention!'
"

Id.; see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c).

1

Kurinsky, 33 F.3d at 597-98 (citing A-Mark, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv.

Dep't, 593 F.2d 849, 851 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (Tang, J., concurring) (quoting S.
REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946))).
15 Id. at 598 (citing Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777 F.2d 822, 825
(2d Cir. 1985) (Oakes, J., concurring) (quoting Tort Claims Against the United States:
Hearings on S. 2690 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 38 (1940))).

156Id.

'7 Id. ("Simply put, the legislative history of the Act is consistent with our reading
of § 2680(c) and there is no basis for departing from the 'plainmeaning' of the statute.").
1' See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
16

See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.

1

See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
2A SINGER, supra note 146, § 47.17.

16
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and "seizure" actually constitutes a separate ground for the ruling and is
therefore irrelevant to the issue regarding the application of the § 2680(c)
exception to all law-enforcement officers."
Moreover, the legislative history of the provision is sparse and
seemingly contradictory. While the quotation by Alexander Holtzoff cited
in Kurinsky'" seems to support the Sixth Circuit interpretation, a
previous quotation by Holtzoff supports the other circuits: "'The
additional proviso has special reference to the detention of imported
goods in appraisers' warehouses or customs houses, as well as seizures
by law enforcement officials, internal revenue officers, and the like."' 1'
The structure of this sentence does not indicate a nexus between the tax
or customs and application of the exception to law-enforcement officers
in general. It supports a "laundry list" reading of unrelated items.
Consequently, the legislative history must be dismissed . as inconclusive.
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, moreover, is a convention of
statutory construction whereby general terms listed with specific terms are
interpreted as delimited by those specific terms." The goal is to limit
surplusage. If the general term is inclusive of the specific terms listed,
then the specific terms are completely unnecessary. If,
on the other hand,
the specific terms are all-inclusive, no need to include a general term
exists. Ejusdem generis is a method for finding the balance between these
two extremes in order to give meaning to every word in a statute."
According to general principles of statutory construction, five criteria
must be present before ejusdem generis can operate:
(1) the statute contains an enumeration by specific words; (2) the
members of the enumeration suggest a class; (3) the class is not
exhausted by the enumeration; (4) a general reference supplementing the
enumeration, usually following it; and (5)
there is not clearly manifested
an intent that the general term be given a broader meaning than the
doctrine requires."

See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
"See supra note 155 and accompanying text.

'0

16' Kosak

v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 856 (1984) (finding no distinction between

damage due to negligent detention of goods and damage due to the fact of detention itself
under the § 2680(c) exception) (quoting Holtzoff, supra note 118); see also supra note
21 (discussing Kosak).
16 2A SINGER, supra note 146, § 47.17.
167

Id.

16 Id. § 47.18; see Maier v. Patterson, 511 F. Supp. 436, 444 n.9 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
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The second requirement is not met in the present case. A list including
customs and excise does not suggest a class at all, except perhaps that of
all law-enforcement officers. No nexus exists between the collectors of
excise taxes and customs officials which suggests that Congress had any
intention of indicating a class by their enumeration. Excise officials
collect taxes, while customs officials collect customs duties. Both are

involved in the collection of revenue, a fact which would seemingly limit
the scope of the term "law-enforcement officer" to those situations in
which a government official is engaged in a revenue-collecting func9
16

tion.

However, customs officials are also saddled with the responsibility of

ensuring that contraband such as drugs do not cross the border. This
function is similar to that performed by DEA agents. Customs officials
also ensure that illegal aliens are not permitted to cross the border.'
(defining the concept of ejusdem generis).
This argument would be appealing if§ 2680(c) did not specifically name "officers
of customs" and "officers of excise.' Customs officials do a variety of things other than
merely collect "tax-like" revenues. The duties of excise officers, whatever they may be,
need not be delved into since the diversity of the duties perfonned by customs officers
prevents the application of ejusdem generis. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
'" The duties of customs officers are as follows:
The United States Customs Service collects the revenue from imports and
enforces customs and related laws and also administers the Tariff Act of 1930,
as amended, and other customs laws. Some of the responsibilities which the
Customs Service is specifically charged with are as follows: properly assessing
and collecting customs duties, excise taxes, fees, and penalties due on imported
merchandise; interdicting and seizing contraband, including narcotics and illegal
drugs; processing persons, carriers, cargo, and mail into and out of the United
States; administering certain navigation laws; detecting and apprehending
persons engaged in fraudulent practices designed to circumvent customs and
related laws; protecting American business and labor by enforcing statutes and
regulations such as the Anti-dumping Act; countervailing duty; copyright,
patent, and trademark provisions; quotas; and marking requirements for
imported merchandise.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 386 (6th ed. 1990). A definition of "excise tax" is as follows:
A tax imposed on the performance of an act, the engaging in an occupation, or
the enjoyment of a privilege. A tax on the manufacture, sale, or use of goods
or on the carrying on of an occupation or activity, or a tax on the transfer of
property. In current usage the term has been extended to include various license
fees and practically every internal revenue tax except the income tax (e.g.,
federal alcohol and tobacco excise taxes, I.R.C. § 5001 et seq.).
Id. at 563 (citations omitted). Given the Sixth Circuit's penchant for using Black's Law
Dictionary to support its positions, it seems that a perusal of these passages would have
indicated such a diversity in the activities of a customs officer, and, on the other hand,
such specificity with regard to the duties of an "officer ...of excise," that the doctrine
16
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This job is similar to that of a border patrol officer. Excise officials do
none of these things. As the functions of excise officials and customs
officials tend toward dissimilarity, the applicability of ejusdem generis
becomes more tenuous. The dissimilarity is sufficient at least to bring the
applicability of the doctrine into question.
Consider what the state of the case law would be regarding this list
if "customs" and "excise" had not been included. The issues would
revolve around whether customs officials and excise officials were "lawenforcement officers" under this exception. More likely, the government
litigators may not have had the presence of mind to include customs
officers and tax collectors with F.B.I. agents and DEA agents as lawenforcement officers and hence proper subjects of the § 2680(c)
exception. Structuring the exception as it did, Congress expanded its
possible applications rather than limiting them. 7'
As ample room for debate exists, the benefit of the doubt ought to
fall in favor of the government. The government can only be sued when
Given the amount of
it gives its consent by clear legislative act.
judicial disagreement and confusion over the proper application of
§ 2680(c), the grant of consent can be called anything but clear. Thus,
sovereign immunity should bar lawsuits against the United States for
damage caused by detention of goods by any law-enforcement officer.
The judicial acrobatics engaged in by the Sixth Circuit to support its
minority approach are difficult even for legal scholars to follow. Clearly
the doctrine of ejusdem generis has its place in statutory construction;
however, in general, statutes are to be understood in the normal sense of
the words used in them.' Detention of goods by any other law-enforcement officer is straightforward enough. Furthermore, the legislative
inactivity in response to over forty years of judicial interpretation
supports the well-entrenched position of the majority of the circuits on
this issue. Since no public policy has been offered in support of its
limitation and since statutory construction and case law support broad
application of the § 2680(c) exception, 74 the U.S. Supreme Court
of ejusdem generis should not have been evoked.

171See supra note 112 and accompanying text.

Van Buskirk v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 553, 554 (E.D. Tenn. 1962)
(concluding that the federal government cannot "be sued without its consent").
172See

Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 853 (1984).
Halverson v. United States, 972 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.

174 See

Ct. 1297 (1993); Cheney v. United States 972 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1992) (per curiam);
Schlaebitz v. United States Dep't of Justice, 924 F.2d 193 (11th Cir. 1991); Ysasi v.
Rivkind, 856 F.2d 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Formula One Motors, Ltd. v. United States, 777
F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. 2,116 Boxes of Boned Beef, Weighing
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should grant certiorari on this issue and resolve it contrary to the minority
position of the Sixth Circuit in Kurinsky v. United States.
CONCLUSION

The Sixth Circuit has seen fit to rule in opposition to its sister circuits
on the scope of the application of § 2680(c) of the FrCA. Other courts
ruling on this issue have broadly interpreted this exception to the FTCA
waiver of sovereign immunity to apply to all law-enforcement officers.
The lone Sixth Circuit has interpreted the exception more narrowly to
apply only to those law-enforcement officials acting in a tax or customs
capacity. The Sixth Circuit reached this conclusion primarily on the basis
of a misapplication of the statutory construction principle of ejusdem
generis. Since the specific terms are not indicative of a particular class,
ejusdem generis does not apply and should not be used to overturn more
than forty years of legislative and U.S. Supreme Court silence in the face
of the alternate interpretation. An overly restrictive reading of the
§ 2680(c) exception to the FTCA's general waiver of sovereign immunity
is clearly not warranted given that sovereign immunity is not waived
except by a clearly expressed intent by the government to do so.
Todd k Wright

Approximately 154,121 Pounds, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, Jarboe-Lackey
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(D. Idaho 1975); United States v. 1500 Cases, More or Less, 249 F.2d 382 (7th Cir.
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